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§II of Carnap’s Der Raum1 is both the strangest and, at first sight, the
least relevant to Carnap’s later thought. The section is about Anschau-
ungsraum, usually translated “intuitive space,” though a better translation
would be “space of intuition”: the space in which objects can be given to
us in sensible intuition, which is to say, perception.2 What Carnap says
about it seems both difficult and exotic. Nevertheless I will suggest that
this section, if correctly understood—in particular, if taken in the context
of Carnap’s sources—contains the first example of some important patterns
which Carnap would return to again and again.
The features I have in mind are easy to miss because they are not an-
nounced as the main theme of the section. Its main point is to assign An-
schauungsraum to the Husserlian faculty of material eidetic insight. Follow-
1Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien Erga¨nzungshefte, no. 56
(Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1922).
2It is worth emphasizing, if only because there seems to be some confusion about this in
the literature, that the primary meaning of Anschauung , for most authors in this period,
is ordinary sense perception (including, for some, also related acts such as fantasy and
memory). In other words, it does not mean “intuition” in the contemporary philosophical
sense (in the Aufbau, Carnap uses Intuition to mean something like that), nor is it the
name of a special faculty for knowledge about essences or about mathematics. Those
who take special faculties like that to be forms of Anschauung (and/or call them “pure
intuition,” “intellectual intuition,” Wesenserschauung , etc.), are thereby claiming that
they are analogous to or in some way connected to sense perception. See Husserl, Ideen zu
einer reinen Pha¨nomenologie und pha¨nomenologischen Philosophie, 2d ed. (1922; reprint,
Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993) (henceforth: Ideen I), §3, p. 11: “AuchWesenserschauung
ist eben Anschauung”; echoed by Carnap, Der Raum, §II, p. 23: “Im Allgemeinem mag
aber der Ausdruck Anschauung auch die Wesenserschauung mit umfassen.”
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ing Husserl’s writings of the Ideen period, Carnap identifies that faculty as
the source of all synthetic a priori knowledge.3 In Husserlian terms: it assures
us a priori that certain objects within the region of nature will instantiate
certain formal structures—structures which are themselves known to us, by
way of formal eidetic insight, as a part of formal ontology.4
But Carnap can’t stop there, because he wants to reconcile Husserlian
phenomenology with General Relativity—in other words, with an apparently
a posteriori discovery about the structure of space. To this end, he claims
that eidetic insight reveals only the local character of the Anschauungsraum:
its behavior in (arbitrarily) small regions. This is an ingenious move, insofar
as it is based on Husserl’s own assertions about how eidetic insight works:
that, namely, it always requires a basis in ordinary intuition of matters of
fact.5 Since perception and perceptual imagination are themselves always
local, the argument goes, so too is all material eidetic insight on their basis.
But Carnap can’t stop here, either, and this brings us to the part of
his discussion I want to address. The problem is that mathematical physics
makes constant use of the assumption that some determinate geometry ap-
plies to arbitrarily large regions of space, or even, in physical cosmology, to
space-time as a whole. If eidetic insight does not justify that assumption,
what does? Husserl himself, when he confronted this question in the Cri-
sis period, answered that it is indeed unjustifiable. But Carnap does not
3As noted by Sahotra Sarkar (“Husserl’s Role in Carnap’sDer Raum,” in Thomas Bonk,
ed., Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap
[Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003], 184), both Carnap and Husserl express some reservations about
this Kantian terminology. See, respectively, Ideen I, Introduction, p. 6; Der Raum §V,
p. 63. But both are willing to use it, as Husserl says, “in order to let historical parallels be
heard [anklingen]” (loc. cit.). Carnap does so beginning on the very page just cited, and
Husserl, among other places, at Ideen I, §16, p. 31 (beginning: “If one wants to preserve
the echoes [Ankla¨nge] of Kant’s critique of reason . . . ”).
4This way of putting things is subtly but, I think, importantly different from the
formulations of some other interpreters (see, e.g., Michael Friedman, “Carnap and Weyl
on the Foundations of Geometry and Relativity Theory,” Erkenntnis 42 [1995], reprinted
in Reconsidering Logical Positivism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 46;
Alan Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence
of Logical Positivism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 153). The point is
not so much to distinguish a particular instance of a certain formal structure by giving
it a particular intuitive character, as to guarantee that a particular concrete structure
(which like all such structures has its own intuitive character) will indeed instantiate (be
a deformalization of) a certain formal essence.
5Ideen I, §3, p, 12.
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want to take that path. Instead, he attempts to show that our eidetic in-
sight, limited as it is to small regions, nevertheless prescribes a type of global
structure to space: a structure general enough to be compatible with both
classical physics and General Relativity, yet specific enough to back up the
possibility of mathematical physics. He therefore introduces two steps which
do not correspond well to anything in Husserl’s epistemology: the completion
and generalization of the Anschauungsraum. And these, I will claim, involve
ideas which Carnap was never to repudiate—while at the same time showing
the influence both of Driesch and of a different, earlier Husserl.
1 Carnap and Husserl on going beyond the limits of intuition
According to Carnap, the Anschauungsraum is “completed” through a step-
by-step extension of the features of our limited perceptual space into an
unlimited global structure, aGesamtgefu¨ge. This is justified, he says, because
“if . . . the species of a formation permits a second one of the same species
to be added on to it in a determinate manner, we can demand [fordern]
that this adding-on should be further possible without end” (23). The terms
Gefu¨ge and fordern in this context are Drieschian; I will return to that
in the next section. For now it is enough to note that this procedure of
“adding on” is supposedly enough to determine a global structure for space—
that of a three-dimensional metric space which is everywhere asymptotically
Euclidean—without, however, determining further which such space it must
be. Otherwise put: it supposedly reveals a generic material essence for global
space, determining it as the deformalization of a certain formal-ontological
structure.6 This generic material eidos is what Carnap calls R′3m.
Here we immediately face two problems. First, it is not easy to see how
Carnap’s technical construction can work. Indeed, Sahotra Sarkar, writing
on this very point, has concluded that the situation is hopeless.7 Second,
6In contrast, Husserl (Ideen I, §13, p. 27) claims that the (specific) material essence
of space is a deformalization of “Euclidean manifold” (by which he presumably means:
three-dimensional Euclidean manifold). On deformalization and formal generalization see
Husserl, loc. cit.; Carnap, Der Raum, §IV, pp. 60–61; Michael Friedman, A Parting of
the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court,
2000), 66–7; Sarkar, “Husserl’s Role,” 186–7.
7For if we add actual small regions of Euclidean space smoothly one to another, we will
obviously just get a big Euclidean space, whereas, if we add, so to speak, infinitesimally
small regions, then no amount of iteration will ever get us anywhere. See Sarkar, “Husserl’s
Role,” 188.
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it now becomes unclear in what sense the result of this construction is an
Anschauungsraum. If material eidetic insight never actually gives the essence
of global, unlimited space, how can R′3m count as a material eidos at all?
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I suspect that the technical problem is not insuperable. Carnap speaks
in a rough, pictorial manner, akin to a physicist’s talk about, say, adding up
cylindrical shells of width dr. It is probably possible to come up with a more
rigorous formulation, and likely, moreover, that Carnap himself had some
awareness of how to do that.9 But, even so, the question remains: what led
Carnap to express himself in such a confusing way?
The answer, I think, has to do with the second, epistemological problem
raised above. By invoking an iterative process of “adding-on,” Carnap al-
ludes to a case in which iterative adding-on is literally at issue: namely, the
process, basic to Husserl’s early views on arithmetic, of adding new members
to sensible collectiva. It is difficult to prove that Carnap actually does have
that in mind: although the Philosophie der Arithmetik is mentioned in the
bibliography of Der Raum, and is at one point explicitly cited, it clearly has
nothing like the presence of Ideen I. Still, given Carnap’s serious interest
in Husserl, it would have been natural for him to consult the earlier book.
And what Husserl says there is strikingly relevant. He admits that our ac-
tual ability add on members in intuition is extremely limited. This looks
like a major problem for the formation of large number concepts, because,
as Husserl says, “no concept can be thought without being founded in a
concrete intuition.”10 But, he explains, besides authentic, intuitive represen-
tations, we can also form “logically equivalent” symbolic ones which serve
as “surrogates” for them—even, where the actual object is “inaccessible,”
as permanent surrogates (216).11 Under certain circumstances, moreover,
8See Sarkar, op. cit., 182; Richardson, Carnap’s Construction, 156. (However, to the
extent that Sarkar and Richardson’s worries are about the freely stipulated nature of the
Forderungen, they will be addressed below in the section on Driesch.)
9Since our sensible intuition doesn’t include any absolute scale, it could be maintained
that eidetic insight only reveals laws which apply arbitrarily well in arbitrarily small re-
gions. The resulting axioms could be then stated in purely local (differential) terms, and
the Forderungen about adding segments along lines replaced with the demand for an affine
connection.
10Philosophie der Arithmetik: Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen (Halle-Saale:
C.E.M. Pfeffer [Robert Stricker], 1891), 84.
11Husserl gives, as an example of symbolic representation, the representation of a certain
house as the house on such-and-such corner of such-and-such an intersection (216). That
two representations are “logically equivalent” means, basically, that they refer to the same
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we can form symbolic representations which extend beyond—even infinitely
beyond—the capabilities of our intuition. This is possible when “a clear prin-
ciple is given, according to which any concept which has already been formed
can be transformed (or can be symbolically represented as transformed) into
a new one which is sharply distinct from the first,” so that “it is a priori
determined, through sharp conceptual moments, what this continuously ex-
tending set includes or can include, and what it cannot.”12
Husserl’s main interest at this stage is the number series, but he also men-
tions geometry: one example of something beyond the reach of our intuition
is “the light-years of the astronomers” (214), and one example of an infinite
set which can be symbolically represented is the set of points on a line (247).
So it would be no stretch for Carnap to apply this idea, in his own context,
to the quasi-iterative construction of global space. The same idea, moreover,
also helps to explain the processes of “generalization” by which he arrives
at spaces of higher dimension. This supposedly involves the realization that
complete three-dimensional spaces of different kinds can be found together
inside a higher-dimensional space, “in the sense in which . . . R′3m contains
planes, spheres, and the most various other surfaces.”13 Here, too, we have
a series of ways of “adding-on” (or adding-up) which has a very limited ba-
sis in our authentic spatial intuition, but which then proceeds, symbolically,
infinitely far beyond that.
It still remains unclear whether R′3m, let alone some higher-dimensional
manifold, is properly called a “space of intuition”: after all, no object corre-
sponding to these conceptual structures can ever be given in sense or imagi-
nation. Carnap himself seems unsure when he speaks of higher-dimensional
formations as given in “a mode of representation related to intuitive grasp-
ing which is composed of intuitive and conceptual [elements]” (30). But the
comparison to the number series shows that such knowledge, whether “intu-
itive” or not, might well be a priori—that is, in this case, synthetic a priori.
That comparison is disturbed only by the claim, crucial to Carnap’s project,
that in the geometrical case we have a choice of what to “demand” in order
to complete the structure. If all Forderungen are ours to make (Carnap calls
them “free-willed positings”), then how can any of them be a priori neces-
objects (217). In other words, this is something like extensional equivalence. There is
obviously some relationship between these ideas and Carnap’s treatment of structural
descriptions in the Aufbau; the remarks at Der Raum, §II, p. 22 are an intermediate stage.
12Philosophie der Arithmetik , 247.
13Carnap, Der Raum, §II, p. 30.
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sary, and how can we tell which are? So we need to understand the ways in
a choice of Forderungen can or cannot be made in advance of all experience.
2 Carnap and Driesch on Forderung , Ordnung and Gefu¨ge
While Husserl is a philosopher who needs no introduction, the same perhaps
cannot be said of Hans Driesch. Today Driesch is mostly remembered, if at
all, as a proponent of neo-vitalism. In Germany in the 20’s, however, he had
some reputation for his work on general issues of logic, metaphysics, and epis-
temology. Carnap, at least, mentions him prominently, both in Der Raum
and in the Aufbau, and with special attention to his logico-epistemological
book, the Ordnungslehre.14 In Der Raum, Carnap describes formal geometry
not only as a part of Husserlian formal ontology, but also as a “pure Ord-
nungslehre,” or as a part of logic “in the sense of Ordnungslehre,” or “general
Ordnungslehre.”15 He explains our synthetic a priori knowledge of the An-
schauungsraum in terms, not only of Husserl’s Wesenserschauung , but also
of Driesch’s independence from the “quantum of experience” (22). And he
lists Driesch as a source to consult on “the widening of the spatial realm”
(81, note to p. 26).16
Driesch’s system is complicated, but the main features of interest here
can be summarized briefly. All philosophy begins with phenomenological re-
flection upon the stream of experience. Nothing much could be said about
this, however, if there it were not for certain “order constituents”17 in the
stream of experience thus revealed. Such an order constituent is a sign of
“final conclusiveness” (Endgu¨ltigkeit) (5). It establishes that what has been
experienced has been experienced as such-and-such, and that this “as” ought
to hold for all further experience, as well (6). The second part of philoso-
phy, Ordnungslehre, thus arises as “the theory of final conclusiveness on the
grounds of a methodological solipsism” (8).
Because this Ordnungslehre is what first establishes or reveals an ought,
14Ordnungslehre: Ein System des nicht-metaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie, mit be-
sonderer Beru¨cksichtigung der Lehre vom Werden, 1st ed. (Jena: Diederichs, 1912). This
is the edition Carnap cites in Der Raum; the Aufbau he cites the second, significantly
revised edition (1923).
15Der Raum, §I, p. 8; §IV, p. 60; note to p. 60, p. 85.
16The specific citation from Driesch is to the Ordnungslehre, p. 109 ff. (the section on
space). The other three authors listed there are mathematicians: Killing, Pasch, and
Kerry.
17Ordnungslehre, 6.
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Driesch says that its “primordial achievement” (Urleistung) is a demand, a
Forderung , of order (7). Every order constituent presents itself as the fulfill-
ment of this demand (18). Ordering thought thus fulfills its own demands
in the act of making them: it cannot be constrained by any order, because
it first produces and recognizes order. In this sense, all order is its “free
achievement” (34). Nevertheless, according to Driesch, there is a kind of
Forderung which reflects back on the ordering ego itself, an “ought to posit
positings which ought to hold” (6). This is what eventually allows thought
to posit objects which make demands on it , and about which it can therefore
be incorrect. Such objects, which first occur in the realm of natural actuality,
are then “as if” independent of the ego (161–2).
The special type of Forderung in question is “the self-demand of parsi-
mony of positings” (110). Driesch first discusses it at length in his section
on space—in other words, in the very section which Carnap explicitly cites—
but its full importance becomes clear only in the realm of natural actuality,
where thought seeks to achieve its goal of parsimony by establishing a quasi-
logical necessity, according to which later experiences are “as if co-posited”
with earlier ones (146). This demand can be met, however, only in a cer-
tain selected piece, a certain Ausschnitt , of experience (132), within which
experiences are interpreted as the appearance of naturally actual objects at
different points in their process of becoming. Now a “system,” or Gefu¨ge,
for Driesch, is an ordering-type in which each element implies all the others,
so that the generic character of the Gefu¨ge already predetermines all the
different ways it can be instantiated (93, 121).18 Nature, therefore, from the
point of view of Ordnungslehre, is just a selection of experiences in which
“a particular Gefu¨ge of ordering thought-demands is found to be fulfilled : a
Gefu¨ge of demands with respect to becoming” (132).
This selection is possible, however, only thanks to more fundamental
types of Gefu¨ge which occur at earlier stages. Suppose, to take Driesch’s
example, that I have an experience of seeing three houses. This will only
count as a correct experience, an actual perception of houses, if it does not
18Driesch indicates several times in the text (pp. 87, 93, 138) and also in the index (344)
that Gefu¨ge is supposed to be the equivalent of, or replacement for, the term System.
This is part of his general policy of using German, rather than Greek or Latinate, terms
(see p. 10). Cf. Thomas Mormann, “Synthetic Geometry and the Aufbau,” in Bonk, ed.,
Language, Logic, and Truth, 47. Mormann seems puzzled by Carnap’s use of the term
Ordnungsgefu¨ge: he notes that it is “not a terminus technicus in mathematics,” but doesn’t
suggest any alternative origin.
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contradict the unified positing of nature demanded by the principle of parsi-
mony. But the possibility of such contradiction depends on the unified order,
not only of time (which is what the demand for parsimony with respect to
becoming immediately entails), but also of space.19 To say that an expe-
rience is correct is to say that “here and now, that is, in these points of
the space of nature . . . and the time of nature . . . , this such exists with
natural actuality.”20 And the unified structure of space is itself the result of
an earlier demand for parsimony, which results in its own Gefu¨ge.
Looking back at that earlier stage, we can follow up to the exact point
where Carnap and Driesch diverge. According to Driesch, spatiality is a
primitive type of being-thus (Sosein): a mode of relatedness marked by cer-
tain characteristics which themselves “are just there for thought,” and can no
more be described than, for example, the color green (109). Carnap opens §II
of Der Raum with the same point, using Driesch’s technical term, Sosein.21
Driesch (loc. cit.) goes on to enumerate the primitive “characteristics” in
question; he refers the reader to Hilbert (among others) for further details.
Carnap offers a more detailed list of axioms, derived from Hilbert, which
determine essentially those same characteristics.22 Beyond these character-
istics, according to Driesch, “thought knows” one more thing about spatial
experiences: namely, that “space as one is the common arena of their ex-
istence,” so that “segments, planes, and parts of space can be increased by
a so much through adding-on others of the same kind” (loc. cit.). We
have already seen Carnap’s version of that, and how, in a Husserlian vein,
he understands its implications for the range of intuition-based knowledge.
Finally, Driesch explains that thought must now make “distinct” use of the
Forderung of parsimony, because there is here “a genuine choice between sev-
eral final-conclusivenesses which present themselves as possible to adhere to”
(109-10), and goes on to show how only the demand of parsimony requires
space as a whole to have a certain type of order, and in particular to satisfy
19The asymmetry between Driesch’s treatments of spatial and of temporal order is very
marked: the former belongs to pure or general Ordnungslehre, while the latter is a feature
of the theory of natural actuality (see Ordnungslehre, 82, 148). Carnap is aware that such
a treatment will not sit well with General Relativity, but he dodges the issue in Der Raum:
see §III, pp. 40–41, 46.
20Ordnungslehre, 160.
21Der Raum, §II, pp. 22, 24, and note that Driesch is cited (among others) in the note
to the latter page, p. 80.
22Der Raum, §II, pp. 24–5.
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the parallel postulate (111–16). This, at last, is where Carnap and Driesch
part ways.
Not that Carnap departs from Driesch entirely, however. He agrees that
the “spatial system” (Raumgefu¨ge), while not determined by empirical facts,
is indeed determined from an “end-positing” standpoint which invokes the
“teleological and methodological principle” of simplicity.23 But this principle,
he explains, involves a Forderung for simplicity which “relates to the total
presentation of the facts”—a demand for parsimony not in geometrical deter-
minations per se, but only in “the structure which follows on the ground of
those determinations” (§III, p. 56).24 In other words, just as Carnap derives
the limits of eidetic insight from Husserl’s own principles, he now claims that
Driesch ought himself to recognize the overriding importance of thought’s
goal of order in the realm of nature. The “end and goal” of the construction
of intuitive space is the construction of “a contradiction-free Gefu¨ge” of phys-
ical actuality (§IV, p. 61). The overriding teleological principle of simplicity
in natural law therefore reaches back into the earlier stages of Ordnungslehre
and creates an ought : that certain Forderungen which could be made inde-
pendently of the “quantum of experience” ought not to be; that the structure
of space “ought” not to be “freely chosen without regard for [the empirical
facts], even though the thinkable possibility of that choice must always be
maintained” (§III, pp. 55–6).
Hence whereas Carnap disagrees with Husserl about the extent of mate-
rial eidetic insight, he disagrees with Driesch about the extent of teleological
determinateness in advance of experience. But this is equally much a dis-
agreement about the limits of the synthetic a priori, because all synthetic
a priori judgments, according to Driesch, are based on a priori Forderungen
for co-positing, which make the subject of the judgment co-posit its pred-
icate “simply because they demand its ought-to-be-co-positing nature.”25
If the global structure of space ought not be chosen in advance of experi-
ence, in fact, then one might think that there would be no synthetic a priori
knowledge of it at all: just an a posteriori choice between the many possi-
ble contradiction-free geometries.26 But thought demands unity and order.
23Der Raum, §III, p. 56.
24Note that although Forderung can mean “postulate” in a technical sense (as a trans-
lation of Euclid’s term aÒthma), Carnap’s use of it in contexts like this shows that he has
much more than this technical sense in mind.
25Ordnungslehre, 80; see also 162.
26I suspect that some idea like this is behind Sarkar’s question as to why we even need
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An “unmediated standing against and outside of one another as either-or”
of different possible geometries would be “most unsatisfying from the view-
point of scientific unity.”27 And so there is still room for an a priori demand
for order: for a Gefu¨ge, namely, from which all the possible choices can be
derived. Such a structure must prescribe to its members all and only those
properties which make it possible to regard them as consistent extensions of
perceptual intuition. Carnap claims to have shown that these do not include
any one determinate dimensionality, or any extra-topological structure what-
soever: in particular, that they do not include the demand that any metric
be defined.28 But they do include topological properties deriving from the
fact—known with material eidetic certainty—that spatial experience is ev-
erywhere locally Euclidean. And these, according to Carnap, are precisely
the properties which make it possible to supply a space with the full structure
of a Riemannian manifold. He concludes that R′nt—in effect, the system of
all metrizable topological spaces of any (uniform) dimension—is “the most
universal Gefu¨ge built out of members with the character of intuition.”29
Our knowledge of this universal system—our knowledge, that is, that the
concrete individual relation-structure, physical space, must fall under one
of its members—can be called “synthetic a priori.” For, on the one hand,
physical space is the space in which sensible particulars are encountered,
and so material eidetic insight guarantees that it30 will have the correct local
properties. And, on the other hand, because the global demand posed by
the system R′nt is just the demand for order and unity which is responsible
for selecting out a realm of natural actuality in the first place, experiences
which fail to conform to it will count not as actual perception but as dream
or fantasy or hallucination. Carnap, admittedly, does not explicitly make
this last point anywhere in Der Raum. But it is found in the very passages
of Driesch which he cites, and we know, furthermore, that it was soon to
a “philosophical geometry” (“Husserl’s Role,” 187–8).
27Der Raum, §II, p. 30. Note that this is the “viewpoint” Carnap mentions in the
preceding sentence, from which R′3m is not only capable of generalization but requires it.
Cf. Sarkar, “Husserl’s Role,” 183.
28Carnap is not crystal clear on this point, but it seems the only way to make sense of
his hierarchy: the Rnm’s are generic metric spaces with indeterminate metric, whereas the
Rnt’s are metrizable topological spaces for which no metric structure—not even a generic,
indeterminate one—has been supplied.
29Der Raum, §II, p. 31.
30Or some manifold of lower dimension within it (see Carnap’s argument in this regard,
§V, pp. 66–7).
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turn up in the Aufbau.31
We can thus understand Carnap’s claim that R′nt constitutes the sum of
all our synthetic a priori knowledge about spatiality, or that in other words
it belongs to the “conditions of the possibility of any object of experience
whatsoever.”32 Those words from the First Critique have been understood
in various ways. In Der Raum they have the following Husserlio-Drieschian
sense: a “condition of possibility of any object of experience” is a property
of sensible objects whose necessity can be made a matter of eidetic evidence,
once thought makes all those demands which, in advance of all experience,
it ought to make.
3 Carnap’s later thought
It would be useful to study the continuing interaction between Husserl and
Driesch in Carnap’s next major work, the Aufbau. Here, however, I will in-
stead briefly deliver on my initial promise to show that certain themes intro-
duced, under their influence, in Der Raum, stayed with Carnap throughout
his life.
The main thing to notice is that, because Husserl’s eidetic insight is anal-
ogous to sense perception, Carnap in Der Raum is already a kind of empiri-
cist.33 Carnap will soon turn against this kind of eidetic data, as well as, in
general, against any kind of “pure being-such” which can be experienced but
not explicitly described. Even later on, however, he always remains relaxed
on the question of what is to count as empirical data. The point is always
that there be something to which our speech and thought is responsible,
against which it can be checked. Eidetic insight, it seems, was rejected be-
cause Carnap found it unsuitable to fulfill that role, rather than, say, because
of a naturalistic worry that human beings have no causal interactions with
essences.
In Der Raum, in any case, Carnap still treats eidetic insight as an ad-
missible source of quasi-empirical data. And, if “empiricism” is understood
in that broad sense, then there are striking similarities between the form it
takes here and the forms it takes much later in Carnap’s development.
31Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998 [reprint of the 2nd ed.]),
§170, pp. 237–8. The same thought is already clearly present in the “Entwurf” of 1924
(document ASP/RC081-05-02), p. 3.
32Der Raum, §V, p. 67.
33As, indeed, Husserl claims to be in the Ideen: see §20, p. 38.
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There is, first of all, the thought that the realm of scientific knowledge
vastly exceeds, and yet continues to be justified by, its empirical basis. In
the Aufbau, with its strict reductionism and verificationism, this theme is
muted, but still present in several ways. First, the empirical statements of
the Aufbau system can in general only be reduced to statements about the
entire stream of the subject’s experiences. But, as Carnap himself empha-
sizes, the idea that I might have simultaneous access to all that is a wild
fiction34—no better than the fiction that I might intuitively grasp a huge
collectivity, or the whole of space, or a four-dimensional shape. In that
way all such statements go way beyond the actual data that back them up.
Secondly, Carnap says in the Aufbau that a constitutional system with a
different basis—for example, a physical basis—would be equally acceptable,
meaning equally as empirical , as the methodologically solipsistic system ac-
tually adopted there.35 Carnap does not explain how the concepts in such a
system could be tested for empirical validity, but clearly it could not be by
reducing them to the given. Finally and most explicitly, Carnap at one point
defends the status of pure mathematics as Erkenntnis not, as one might ex-
pect, on the basis that mathematical language is tautologous, but rather on
the basis that there is some “relation of dependence,” in either direction,
between mathematical statements and empirical ones.36
All three of these features gain prominence in Carnap’s later thought.
When Carnap begins to say that universal statements can never be com-
pletely verified37—meaning, not by any finite amount of data—he is in a way
only countenancing a slight (or slightly transfinite) expansion of the idealized
empirical subject which the Aufbau already requires. And when he says that
even particular statements about the physical basis can in general not be
reduced to protocol sentences but are instead justified by the fact that pro-
tocol sentences can be deduced from them,38 he is in a way just fleshing out
a possibility he had already raised in the Aufbau. And when, finally, Carnap
34See Aufbau, §101, pp. 139–41.
35The possibility of a system with physical basis is discussed in §59, pp. 80–81. That
constitutional systems with other bases draw the same boundary between empirical and
metaphysical is asserted (without proof) at §176, p. 247.
36Namely, because a mathematical statement can stand in contradiction to empirical
facts. See §181, pp. 257–8.
37First in “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft,” Erkenntnis
2 (1932):440 and then, at greater length, in “Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of
Science 3 (1936):425–7.
38Also first in the “Physikalische Sprache,” loc. cit.
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says that the theoretical language is connected to the observation language
at only a few points,39 he simply gives to the whole of physical science the
status that pure mathematics has in the Aufbau.
What, however, justifies science in using these huge extra-empirical struc-
tures? What, in other words, marks science off from metaphysics—which
Carnap never gave up on attacking for its lack of empirical content? The
answer is, first of all, that these structures are freely constructed in a re-
gion where the empirical basis does not compel us to go one way or another.
From Der Raum and the conventionalist papers which followed it, through
the Aufbau, down to Carnap’s late writings, he always emphasizes that. But
he also always emphasizes, as he does in Der Raum, and as Driesch does in
the Ordnungslehre, that “freedom” in this context doesn’t mean the freedom
of indifference. A free choice is not a choice that is arbitrary (willku¨rlich),
but rather one in accordance with practical principles (Grundsa¨tze).40 First
and foremost among such principles is the principle of “scientific parsimony”
(ibid.), which in Der Raum, as in the Ordnungslehre, is mostly manifested in
the demand for a simple and unified causal connection of events. That, once
again, remains an important focus for Carnap through the conventionalist
papers, the Aufbau, and beyond. But a further or deeper consequence of the
principle of parsimony is the demand for the “unity of science”: recall that
the generalization of space is said, in Der Raum, to be required “from the
viewpoint of scientific unity” (30). This demand, which means roughly that
the whole conceptual apparatus of science should form a single system with
its roots in a relatively limited basis, is also one that Carnap would never
drop.
Carnap and Driesch’s use of the Kantian term “principle,” in a context
where the issue is the nature of freedom, suggests, furthermore, that the
supreme practical principles ought to be ethical in nature. In the Ordnungs-
lehre, the penultimate stage (before psychology, which is really a transition
to metaphysics) concerns the ethical and religious as order-structures which,
thought demands, ought to be desired for the totality of the human race and
for the world as a whole. Driesch raises, but does not resolve, an issue about
what sort of wished-for human “totality” (Ganzheit) is correctly demanded
39“The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts,” in H. Feigl and M. Scriven,
eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1 (1956), 47. The C rules
“connect sentences of LO with certain sentences of LT , for instance, by making a derivation
in the one or the other direction possible.”
40Der Raum, §III, p. 36.
13
here: whether an order in which all humans are ultimately interchangeable,
or one in which each individual must find his or her special role.41 This
tension between a utilitarian ethics, on the one hand, in which individual-
ity is sacrificed to the whole, and an individualistic ethics of self-expression,
on the other, is more or less identical to the dichotomy presented by Car-
nap’s advisor, Bruno Bauch, in the first two sections of his own essay on
ethics42—a work which Driesch, for his part, recommends.43 It is probably
significant, therefore, that Carnap, in the Preface to the Aufbau, addresses
that very dilema, and claims—or, to speak more cautiously, expresses the
faith—that the new attitude, the neue Sachlichkeit , of which scientific phi-
losophy is a limited but essential part, will resolve it. But I will leave further
consideration of this last point for some other occasion.
41Ordnungslehre, 275–6.
42“Ethik,” in W. Windelband, ed., Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwangzigsten Jahr-
hunderts: Festschrift fu¨r Kuno Fischer , vol. 1 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1904), 54–103.
Bauch’s essay is divided into three sections: the first on utilitarianism, the second on
Nietzschean “amoral individualism,” and the third on “critical ethics.”
43Ordnungslehre, 262 n. 1. Evidently, however, neither Driesch nor Carnap found
Bauch’s resolution of the tension in his third section satisfactory.
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